




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MEDICAL RESEARCH
INSTITUTE
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CCCTG
Canadian Critical Care
Trials Group



REMAP-CAP

Randomized, Embedded,
Multifactorial Adaptive Platform
trial for Community-Acquired
Pneumonia

Randomized, Embedded, Multifactorial Adaptive Platform trial for Community- Acquired Pneumonia (REMAP-CAP):

PANDEMIC APPENDIX TO THE CORE PROTOCOL (REMAP-COVID)

REMAP-CAP Pandemic Appendix to the Core Protocol Version 2.0 dated 18 May 2020

Summary

Background: REMAP-CAP is an adaptive platform trial that evaluates multiple aspects of care of patients who are admitted to an Intensive Care Unit (ICU) with severe Community Acquired Pneumonia. It is reasonable to presume that any pandemic respiratory infection of major significance to public health will manifest as severe Community Acquired Pneumonia with concomitant admission to an ICU. Previous pandemics and more localized outbreaks of respiratory emerging infections have resulted in severe Community Acquired Pneumonia (CAP) and admission to an Intensive Care Unit¹⁻³. Admission to an ICU may occur at the time of first presentation to a hospital or may be preceded by admission to a non-ICU ward or floor. For patients admitted to a non-ICU ward there is an opportunity to intervene to prevent the development of severe CAP. A pandemic of respiratory infection is much more likely to be caused by a virus than a bacterium. Differences in trial design may be required for influenza, viruses which are known to result in periodic but unpredictable pandemics, in comparison with other viruses, such as Coronaviruses that may also have pandemic potential.

Previous pandemics and outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases have outlined the urgent need for evidence, preferably from Randomized Clinical Trials, to guide best treatment. However, there are substantial challenges associated with being able to organize such trials when the time of onset of a pandemic and its exact nature are unpredictable⁴⁻⁶. As an adaptive platform trial that enrolls patients during the interpandemic period, REMAP-CAP is ideally positioned to adapt, in the event of a respiratory pandemic, to evaluate existing potential as well as novel treatment approaches.

The precise nature of a respiratory pandemic cannot be known in advance. The Pandemic Appendix to the Core Protocol lists potential adaptations to trial design and management that are generic, in that they will occur irrespective of the nature of the pandemic, as well as adaptations that are possible, depending on the nature of the pandemic, and the process for determining which adaptations will be applied.

The Pandemic Appendix to the Core Protocol also achieves alignment with a separate document, REMAP-COVID Core Protocol, which comprises only those elements of the Core Protocol of REMAP-CAP and the Pandemic Appendix that applies to the COVID-19 pandemic. For the COVID-19 pandemic, a site can utilize either the REMAP-CAP Core Protocol combined with the Pandemic Appendix to the Core Protocol, or REMAP-COVID Core Protocol. Both sets of documents specify identical methods and data requirements. Data derived from sites using either set of documents is

analyzed in the same pandemic statistical model. A single site must use either REMAP-COVID Core Protocol or REMAP-CAP Core Protocol with this associated pandemic appendix.

The objective of the Pandemic Appendix to the Core Protocol (PATC) is to describe the adaptations to the Core Protocol that would apply during a pandemic, including how analyses of domains already operative during the interpandemic period as well as domains that are pandemic-specific, will be integrated during a pandemic. This includes scientific, as well as governance and logistic aspects.

Aim: The primary objective of the REMAP during a pandemic is to identify the effect of a range of interventions to improve outcome for patients admitted to a hospital with acute illness due to suspected or proven pandemic infection, as defined by the pandemic primary end-point.

Methods: The methods that will be utilized during a pandemic are those in the Core Protocol but with potential for changes to the primary end-point, frequency and process for adaptive analyses, and determination of which domains will be analyzed using a statistical model that includes data from patients with proven or suspected pandemic infection. During a pandemic, patients who are neither suspected nor proven to have pandemic infection and for certain pre-existing domains, will continue to be analyzed using the statistical model that is outlined in the Core Protocol that was operating during the pre-pandemic period. Depending on the characteristics of a pandemic, one or more interpandemic domains may be analyzed within the pandemic statistical model and one or more pandemic-specific domains may be commenced for patients with suspected or proven pandemic infection.

Lay description

REMAP-CAP is a global trial examining the best treatments for community-acquired pneumonia. In the setting of a pandemic that causes life-threatening respiratory infection, some key aspects of the study will be changed to integrate new interventions into the trial, evaluate existing interventions within the trial specifically in patients with pandemic infection, alter trial governance, and provide time-critical data for public health. This will allow the platform to identify which treatments work best for patients during a pandemic.

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1. ABBREVIATIONS

CAP	Community-Acquired Pneumonia
CRF	Case Report Form
DSA	Domain-Specific Appendix
DSMB	Data Safety and Monitoring Board
ICU	Intensive Care Unit
ISIG	International Statistics Interest Group
ITSC	International Trial Steering Committee
MERS-CoV	Middle-Eastern Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus
NAI	Neuraminidase inhibitors
PA _t C	Pandemic Appendix to the Core Protocol
PINSNP	Pandemic infection is neither suspected nor proven
PISOP	Pandemic infection is either suspected or proven
PWG	Pandemic Working Group
RAR	Response Adaptive Randomization
REMAP	Randomized, Embedded, Multifactorial, Adaptive Platform trial
REMAP-CAP	Randomized, Embedded, Multifactorial, Adaptive Platform trial for Community-Acquired Pneumonia
RCC	Regional Coordinating Center
RCT	Randomized Controlled Trial
RSA	Region Specific Appendix
SAC	Statistical Analysis Committee
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
WHO	World Health Organization

2. PROTOCOL APPENDIX STRUCTURE

The structure of this protocol is different to that used for conventional trials because this trial is highly adaptive and the description of these adaptations is better understood and specified using a ‘modular’ protocol design. While all adaptations are pre-specified, the structure of the protocol is designed to allow the trial to evolve over time, for example by the introduction of new domains or interventions or both (see glossary, Section 1.2 Core Protocol for definitions of these terms) and commencement of the trial in new geographical regions.

The protocol has multiple modules, in brief, comprising a Core Protocol (overview and design features of the study), a Statistical Analysis Appendix (details of the current statistical analysis plan and models), multiple Domain-Specific Appendices (DSA) (detailing all interventions currently being studied in each domain), a Registry Appendix, this Pandemic Appendix to the Core Protocol, and multiple Regions-Specific Appendices (RSA) (detailing regional management and governance).

The Core Protocol contains all information that is generic to the trial, irrespective of the regional location in which the trial is conducted and the domains or interventions that are being tested. The Core Protocol may be amended but it is anticipated that such amendments will be infrequent.

The Core Protocol does not contain information about the intervention(s), within each domain, because one of the trial adaptations is that domains and interventions will change over time. Information about interventions, within each domain, is covered in a DSA. These Appendices are anticipated to change over time, with removal and addition of options within an existing domain, at one level, and removal and addition of entire domains, at another level. Each modification to a DSA will be subject of a separate ethics application for approval.

The Core Protocol does not contain detailed information about the statistical analysis, because the analysis model will change over time in accordance with the domain and intervention trial adaptations, but this information is contained in the Statistical Analysis Appendix. These Appendices are anticipated to change over time, as trial adaptations occur. Each modification will be subject to approval from the International Trial Steering Committee (ITSC) in conjunction with advice from the International Statistics Interest Group (ISIG) and the Data Safety and Monitoring Board (DSMB).

The Core Protocol also does not contain information that is specific to a particular region in which the trial is conducted, as the locations that participate in the trial are also anticipated to increase over time. Information that is specific to each region that conducts the trial is contained within an RSA. This includes information related to local management, governance, and ethical and regulatory

aspects. It is planned that, within each region, only that region’s RSA, and any subsequent modifications, will be submitted for ethical review in that region.

3. PANDEMIC APPENDIX TO THE CORE PROTOCOL VERSION

The version of the Pandemic Appendix to the Core Protocol is in this document’s header and on the cover page.

3.1. *Version History*

Version 1: Approved by the Pandemic Working Group on 31st January, 2020

Version 1.1: Approved by the Pandemic Working Group on 12th February, 2020

Version 2.0: Approved by the Pandemic Working Group on 18th May, 2020

4. PANDEMIC APPENDIX TO THE CORE PROTOCOL GOVERNANCE

The study administration structure is outlined in the Core Protocol. As outlined in the Core Protocol, a Pandemic Working Group (PWG) is established and works in conjunction with the International Trial Steering Committee (ITSC), to take responsibility for the Pandemic Appendix to the Core Protocol (PA_TC) and to advise on operational aspects following emergence of a pandemic.

4.1. *Pandemic Working Group*

The responsibility of the PWG is to maintain and update this PA_TC and to advise the ITSC regarding application of the PA_TC during a pandemic. The PWG will liaise with individuals and organizations that are external to REMAP-CAP as required. Membership of the PWG is flexible. The core membership is listed but additional members can be added at any time and as required.

Chair: The Chair of the ITSC will Chair the Pandemic Working Group

Members: Prof. Derek Angus
Prof. Yaseen Arabi
Prof. Richard Beasley
A/Prof. Scott Berry
Prof. Frank Brunkhorst
Dr. Lennie Derde

Dr. Robert Fowler
Prof. Anthony Gordon
Mr. Cameron Green
Dr. Ed Litton
Prof. John Marshall
Dr. Colin McArthur
A/Prof Bryan McVerry
Dr. Srinivas Murthy
Prof. Alistair Nichol
Ms. Jane Parker
Prof. Kathy Rowan
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4.2. Contact Details

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5. PANDEMIC WORKING GROUP AUTHORISATION

The Pandemic Working Group have read the appendix and authorize it as the official Pandemic Appendix to the Core Protocol for the study entitled REMAP-CAP. Signed on behalf of the committee,

Chair

Steve Webb



Date

18th May, 2020

6. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

6.1. Introduction

It is reasonable to presume that any pandemic respiratory infection of major significance to public health will manifest as life-threatening respiratory infection including Severe Acute Respiratory illness and severe Community Acquired Pneumonia (CAP) with concomitant admission to hospital, and for some patients, admission to an Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Previous pandemics and more localized outbreaks of respiratory emerging infections have resulted in severe CAP and ICU admission¹⁻³. A pandemic of respiratory infection is much more likely to be caused by a virus than a bacterium and, among viruses a distinction should be drawn between influenza, which is known to result in periodic but unpredictable pandemics, and other viruses, such as Coronaviruses, that may have pandemic potential, as the features of trial design may be different.

Previous pandemics and outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases have outlined the urgent need for evidence, preferably from Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs), to guide best treatment. However, there are substantial challenges associated with being able to organize such trials when the time of onset of a pandemic and its exact nature are unpredictable⁴⁻⁶. As an adaptive platform trial that enrolls patients during the interpandemic period, REMAP-CAP is ideally positioned to adapt, in the event of a respiratory pandemic, to evaluate existing treatments as well as novel approaches.

One of the challenges associated with planning clinical trials during a pandemic is that the precise nature of the infecting organism, clinical consequences, and suitable interventions (particularly those that are pathogen-specific) cannot be reliably known in advance. The speed of clinical progression, from initial infection to life-threatening severe respiratory infection is another feature

that cannot be reliably known in advance. It is likely that a proportion of patients will present with severe CAP but other patients may present to medical attention with illness that is less severe, but remain at risk of progression to severe illness. Patients who require hospital admission, but have less severe illness are a particularly important group, because early intervention at this stage of illness may prevent progression to life-threatening illness. It is also possible that proposed treatment interventions may have differential treatment effect depending on the level of illness severity at the time that treatment is commenced, including treatment effects that are divergent. Nevertheless, a range of scenarios can be anticipated and used to provide direction and guidance regarding the most appropriate research response.

The most likely organism responsible for a respiratory pandemic is a novel influenza virus that has undergone antigenic shift⁷; the most recent influenza pandemic occurred during 2009-2010. In recent years, there have been outbreaks of severe Community Acquired Pneumonia due to novel Coronaviruses which resulted in the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 and the Middle-Eastern Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) outbreak that commenced in 2012. SARS-CoV-2 is the cause of a pandemic of severe respiratory disease (COVID-19), including pneumonia, that commenced in 2019. The pre-specified adaptations to REMAP-CAP will need to be different for influenza in comparison to a non-influenza pandemic pathogen.

6.2. Pandemic research preparedness

6.2.1. Introduction

The conceptual approach to pandemic preparedness has been influenced substantially by the occurrence of the 2009 Influenza A H1N1(2009)pdm pandemic, outbreaks of SARS and MERS-CoV, the Zika pandemic, and Ebola virus disease outbreaks in West Africa⁸. A broad conclusion from these outbreaks is that it is likely that high quality research can change the incidence and consequences of the epidemic but that such research is extremely difficult because planning of research only commences after the discovery of the epidemic. As a consequence, researchers and organizations interested in developing improved processes for research have identified three key elements to facilitate time-critical research about an epidemic. These elements are that the research must be pre-planned, pre-approved, and practiced^{9,10}. REMAP-CAP and, in particular, the PATC, is an attempt to establish these pre-requisites and to guide treatment for patients who may be critically ill with pneumonia as a consequence of infection with a pandemic organism.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has recommended establishing and strengthening outbreak-ready, multi-center clinical research networks in geographically diverse regions to facilitate research

during pandemics.¹¹ It has also recommended testing of protocols during interpandemic periods and stressed the value of such clinical research consortia in collecting and distributing information during a future pandemic.

6.2.2. Pre-planned

Pre-planned means that the trial protocol is written and that the trial processes related to project management, screening, recruitment, delivery of interventions, data collection, data management, analysis, and reporting are all in place. The PATC, in conjunction with the existing REMAP-CAP protocol documents and trial processes, will mean that all aspects that can be pre-planned have been.

6.2.3. Pre-approved

The PATC is a key component of the of the pre-approval strategy. The availability of this document allows ethics review boards, hospital research governance staff, existing and potential sites to understand and approve the study processes that would be implemented during a pandemic. Where different options need to exist, depending on the nature of the pandemic, these are pre-specified, as much as possible. Any unanticipated substantive deviation from this Appendix would be subject to an amendment, hopefully expedited, in the event of a pandemic. The PATC, like the Core Protocol, does not specify any interventions that are evaluated within the REMAP. It is highly likely that one or more research questions (in domains already approved during the interpandemic period) will be relevant specifically in patients with severe respiratory disease including pneumonia caused by the pandemic infection. The PATC allows these questions to continue to be answered specifically in patients with pandemic infection, where appropriate, using Bayesian prior probabilities derived from patients already enrolled during the interpandemic period. It is proposed to develop ‘sleeping domains’, which could be activated if appropriate during a pandemic, as well as retain the option of developing one or more completely new domains following the emergence of pandemic, which would require separate ethical approval and contracts with participating sites.

This strategy, as part of the study design, offers an ethically, clinically and legally acceptable mechanism for research in the context of a pandemic that can be initiated rapidly.

There are two further aspects relevant to ethical approval of the PATC. The first is that existing or pandemic-specific domains of REMAP-CAP may include an intervention that specifies no treatment within that domain (noting that the Core Protocol specifies that all additional standard care is provided with treatment decisions being made by the treating clinician). This is clinically and

ethically appropriate as the response of critically ill patients to a range of different treatments has proven to be unpredictable. There are many examples of treatments that have resulted in harm¹² and situations in which surrogate outcome measures were not reliable indicators of improvement in patient-centered outcomes. As such, there should not be any presumption that it is better for patients to receive active interventions.

The second is the capacity to apply Response Adaptive Randomization (RAR) within the REMAP. As outlined in the Core Protocol, RAR results in an increasing proportion of patients being allocated to any intervention within a domain that has a higher probability of being superior with that proportion increasing as statistical confidence accrues. Participants within REMAP-CAP during a pandemic may be able to benefit from information about the relative effectiveness of interventions that is not in the public domain and not available to patients who are not participants in REMAP-CAP. As outlined in the Core Protocol, any intervention confirmed to be superior within the REMAP is then implemented by application of a RAR proportion that is equal to 100%. RAR will be implemented for pandemic patients as soon as sufficient data have accrued and operational implementation is feasible.

6.2.4. Practiced

REMAP-CAP will be recruiting during the interpandemic period in multiple countries in both Southern and Northern Hemispheres with the support of several Regional Coordinating Centers. This research activity, during the interpandemic period, ensures that sites, site training, project management, data management, analysis processes, and trial governance are functional and practiced. Furthermore, the eligibility process and delivery of trial interventions are optimized for embedding which allows study processes to occur within minimal disruption to the delivery of clinical care, which may well be under substantial strain during a pandemic. There is already extensive experience with the Case Report Form (CRF) that is used and will continue to be used during a pandemic.

6.2.5. Implications of REMAP design during a pandemic

6.2.5.1. *Time-critical generation of evidence*

A pandemic will likely result in a large number of affected persons with cases occurring over a short period of time, perhaps as short as a few months. Conventional clinical trials that utilize frequentist statistical techniques require a fixed sample size with limited capacity to analyze the results of the trial until recruitment is completed. The setting of the sample size requires an estimate of the size of the treatment effect and it is known that the assumptions that are made in setting the size of the

treatment effect are often incorrect^{13,14}. A frequentist trial that over-estimates the size of the treatment effect may conclude without reaching a valid conclusion, whereas one that under-estimates the size of the treatment effect is delayed in providing time-critical information that the treatment is even more effective than estimated.

REMAP-CAP utilizes Bayesian statistical methods which allow frequent adaptive analyses to occur. This will ensure that time-critical information about the effectiveness of treatment interventions is not delayed unnecessarily. The REMAP design is particularly suited to pandemics because it requires no pre-trial assumptions about the size of the treatment effect and will allow dissemination of evidence as soon as possible. Furthermore, as the trial progresses during a pandemic the Data Safety Monitoring Board (DSMB) has access to information from adaptive analyses that may not achieve thresholds to allow reporting as a Platform Conclusion but may be relevant to public health which, under appropriate circumstances, can be shared with public health authorities and the DSMBs of other trials evaluating the same or similar interventions without threatening the scientific validity of the ongoing trial.

6.2.5.2. Multifactorial design and evaluation of interactions

If there are multiple interventions, each of which may have independent effects on outcome, the multi-factorial nature of a REMAP allows these to be evaluated simultaneously, rather than in series or in separate parallel trials (see Figure 1). This design feature contributes to efficiency and is also anticipated to result in more clinical evidence being generated more rapidly during a time-critical pandemic.




Figure 1. The multifactorial structure of REMAP-CAP

Furthermore, where pre-specified, the statistical model utilized in REMAP-CAP will allow estimation of treatment effect of interventions that may be contingent on other treatment assignments within the pandemic component of the REMAP. For example, it is plausible that the effectiveness of an intervention for immune modulation is dependent on co-delivery of an agent that is effective at inhibiting growth or replication of the pathogen. Conventional trials, in which only a single domain of treatment is evaluated, are not capable of detecting this type of treatment-by-treatment interaction, and thereby unable to identify the best overall treatment strategy for these patients.

6.2.6. Setting of research priorities

In 2017, the WHO outlined the research priorities for a pandemic that was caused by a novel strain of influenza. These priorities were:

- Research on the effectiveness of empirical treatment with oseltamivir and other neuraminidase inhibitors (NAI) in critically ill patients, including placebo-controlled trials during seasonal as well as pandemic influenza.
- Investigating alternative strategies to NAI monotherapy to increase antiviral potency and improve clinical outcomes.
- Research on immune-modulatory strategies in severe influenza, including corticosteroids and macrolides.
- A need for high quality data on the effectiveness of most aspects of supportive care related to influenza.
- A need to assess the roles of virologic factors (e.g. replication sites, duration and viral load levels) in larger numbers of patients (including critically ill patients) in causing severe disease and associated complications, linking them to clinical outcomes.

REMAP-CAP is not able to meet all of these requirements but is well suited to evaluate the effectiveness of antiviral therapies active against influenza, immune modulatory strategies and different aspects of supportive care¹⁵. Identical or similar research questions would exist for any pandemic caused by an organism that was not influenza and REMAP-CAP has also similar capabilities in this scenario.

6.3. WHO endorsement

REMAP-CAP has been designated by the WHO as a Pandemic Special Study. Under this designation, it has been tasked with helping answer crucial questions during a declared pandemic, as listed above. This designation ensures that knowledge translation of clinical trial results can occur directly

with policymakers and public health officials for rapid implementation around the globe. It ensures that results generated from REMAP-CAP during a declared pandemic can be translated in an efficient and transparent manner to benefit affected patients.

7. ADAPTATION OF REMAP-CAP DURING A PANDEMIC

This PATC supplements the Core Protocol during a pandemic including deactivation at the conclusion of a pandemic. Decisions regarding the operationalization of the Pandemic Appendix to the Core Protocol are made by the ITSC with advice from the PWG (see Section 8.1). The Appendix sets out all potential adaptations of the Core Protocol and unless otherwise specified, all other aspects of the Core Protocol remain active. Activation of the PATC will be advised to the DSMB with specification of the selected operational characteristics.

7.1. Objectives

The primary objective of this REMAP during a pandemic is to identify the effect of a range of interventions to improve outcome for adult patients admitted to hospital with acute illness due to suspected or proven pandemic infection, as defined by the pandemic primary end-point.

The secondary objective is to determine the effect of a range of interventions on additional endpoints, including endpoints developed by the World Health Organization and adopted core outcome sets.

7.2. Study setting: definition of an ICU and relationship of setting to severity of illness

During the interpandemic period, the REMAP recruits only participants who are admitted to an ICU, and a combination of admission to ICU as well as provision of treatments to support failed organs is used to define severity and eligibility. During a pandemic, there are several factors that may influence the relationship between admission to an ICU and severity of illness. Firstly, there may be insufficient ICU beds available to care for all critically ill patients. This may result in provision of advanced organ support occurring in locations that do not usually provide ICU-level care. During a pandemic, such a location is referred to as a re-purposed ICU. However, a re-purposed ICU needs to be distinguished from a usual hospital ward that is capable of providing some forms of organ support, such as non-invasive ventilation. During a pandemic, there may be substantial delays in transferring a patient from an emergency department to either a ward or an ICU (or a re-purposed ICU). Patients in an emergency department who have been accepted for admission to an ICU are regarded as being admitted to an ICU. Patients in an emergency department who have been

accepted for admission to a ward are regarded as being admitted to a ward. Secondly, patients who are not critically ill may be treated on an ICU for reasons that are not related to severity of illness, such as access to single rooms to achieve objectives related to infection control and prevention. This can influence both admission as well as discharge practices. Thirdly, the threshold at which support for failed organs is provided may be influenced by infection control practices. For example, some forms of respiratory support may be withheld because of concerns related to the risk that staff who are caring for patients may acquire the infection.

To minimize these issues, during a pandemic, the primary determinant of severity is the provision of ICU-level care, which can be interpreted in conjunction with the physical location in which care is being provided. Determination of severity may also take into account a decision to withhold some form of organ failure support that would otherwise have been provided. Where a definition of an ICU is needed, at sites at which the pandemic stratum (see below) has been activated, an area within the hospital that is repurposed so as to be able to deliver one or more of the qualifying organ failure supports specified in the Core Protocol (non-invasive ventilation, invasive ventilation, and vasopressor therapy) will meet the definition of an Intensive Care Unit. It is preferred in such circumstances that the patient is under the care of a specialist who is trained in the provision of critical care, but this is not an essential requirement. A respiratory or other ward that provides non-invasive ventilation (including oxygen therapy delivered by high flow nasal cannula) and continues to do so during a pandemic, will not, generally, meet the definition of an ICU, particularly if the patient is not under the care of a specialist who is trained in the provision of critical care.

In some DSAs, an exclusion criteria is applied to only permit enrollment during a time-window that commences with ICU admission. For the reasons noted above, this may be operationalized using a time-window, of the same duration, that commences with the provision of sustained organ failure support.

7.3. Eligibility criteria

Platform-level eligibility criteria may be modified if necessary to accommodate a published case definition, to align with criteria specified in guidelines, such as the ATS/IDSA guidelines on CAP¹⁶, or to accommodate necessary modifications to the online eligibility system used for enrollment. In previous epidemics of community-based infection, nosocomial acquisition has been well described. Relaxation of the requirement for community acquisition or organ failure criteria or both may be appropriate. In this regard, Version 2.0 of this Appendix modifies the organ failure support criteria so that these no longer apply as a platform-level inclusion criteria, permitting the enrollment of

patients into the platform who are admitted to hospital or an ICU, either with or without organ failure support criteria. In association with the removal of the organ failure requirement, the requirement for a patient to meet criteria for pneumonia may be replaced with a requirement for acute illness due to suspected or proven pandemic infection. All changes to eligibility criteria would apply only to patients in the pandemic stratum (see section 7.4).

As such, the modified platform-level inclusion and exclusion criteria are:

In order to be eligible to participate in the pandemic aspects of REMAP-CAP, a patient must meet the following criteria:

1. Adult patient admitted to hospital with acute illness due to suspected or proven pandemic infection

A potentially eligible patient who meets any of the following criteria will be excluded from participation in this trial:

1. Death is deemed to be imminent and inevitable during the next 24 hours AND one or more of the patient, substitute decision maker or attending physician are not committed to full active treatment
2. Patient is expected to be discharged from hospital today or tomorrow
3. More than 14 days have elapsed while admitted to hospital with symptoms of an acute illness due to suspected or proven pandemic infection
4. Previous participation in this REMAP within the last 90 days

This extension of the platform-level inclusion criteria can apply to patients admitted to an ICU or a ward. In association with the involvement of different clinical teams, the domains and interventions that are available for patients admitted to a ward compared with those admitted to an ICU are permitted to be, but do not have to be, different.

7.4. Pandemic stratum

7.4.1. Introduction

As outlined in the Core Protocol, a pre-specified stratum of the REMAP is the presence or absence of suspected or proven pandemic infection. This is maintained as a 'passive stratum' during the interpandemic period that can become active during a pandemic. It consists of two exclusive strata categories: pandemic infection is neither suspected nor proven (PINSNP) and pandemic infection is

either suspected or proven (PISOP) at baseline. At times when the PATc is not activated, i.e. during the interpandemic period, all participants are categorized as PINSNP.

7.4.2. Activation and deactivation of the PATc and PISOP stratum

In response to a pandemic (see section 8.1), the PISOP stratum is activated using a two-step process. First there is a decision of the ITSC to open the PISOP stratum for the platform. The second step is site-by-site activation of the PISOP stratum, requiring agreement of both the site and the Regional Coordinating Centre (RCC). This allows variation in activity of the pandemic infection to be accommodated with sites only open for PISOP recruitment when there is active pandemic infection locally. Switching-on of the stratum can occur at any time and expected to always be available with less than 24 hours lead time. The capacity to enroll patients into the PISOP stratum can be switched-off on a site-by-site basis, but the ITSC can switch off the PISOP stratum for all sites if it is believed that a pandemic is no longer ongoing. The REMAP applies a new and separate statistical model for participants in the PISOP stratum which can utilize, where appropriate, informative priors derived from pre-pandemic PINSNP participants.

It should be noted that for sites in which the pandemic stratum is open, that the REMAP allows for continued recruitment of patients into the REMAP who are in the PINSNP stratum. For example, during an influenza pandemic, PINSNP would include patients with infection that has been proven to be a non-pandemic strain of influenza. During a pandemic, patients who are in the PINSNP stratum continue to be analyzed using the interpandemic statistical model (see below). As such, there are two categories of PINSNP participants- those included during the interpandemic phase and those included during a pandemic. Both categories of patients contribute to the interpandemic model for all active domains.

The PATc is activated and deactivated for a site at the same time as the PISOP stratum is opened and closed. If a pandemic commences prior to ethical and governance approval of the PATc, the PISOP stratum can be activated using approvals for the Core Protocol, and the PATc would be activated as soon as ethical approval is obtained.

7.5. The pandemic statistical model

7.5.1. Introduction

The model that is active during the pandemic and includes only PISOP patients (for some or all domains) is referred to as the ***pandemic model***. The model that is active before (and after) the

pandemic, which includes PINSNP patients during the pandemic and may include some PISOP patients for some domains, is referred to as the **interpandemic model** (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. Diagram of the interpandemic and pandemic models

The pandemic model is only used for PISOP participants and only for those domains selected by the ITSC. A PISOP patient can contribute to both the pandemic and interpandemic model in different domains but each patient’s contribution to a model is mutually exclusive with respect to each domain. The ITSC will select the domains to be included in the pandemic model where a differential treatment effect is postulated in the presence of pandemic infection or the need exists to learn about the outcome quickly, or both. The extension of this platform-level entry criteria does not apply to domains that are analyzed exclusively within the interpandemic statistical model.

A consequence of the application of two separate statistical models is that treatment-by-treatment interactions can only be evaluated for those domains that are in the same model. The principal advantages of the use of two models are:

- that this is necessary where the pandemic model requires a different primary end-point
- the platform is able to continue recruitment of patients with CAP who are neither suspected nor proven to have pandemic infection
- where appropriate informative priors can be included at commencement of the pandemic model
- where appropriate thresholds for a Statistical Trigger can be modified
- only those domains that are relevant to the pandemic are included within the pandemic model.

During the interpandemic period, it is intended that there may be some domains, for example the Ventilation Domain, that will utilize a separate domain-specific statistical model. It should be noted

that during the interpandemic period, such a domain is not part of the interpandemic statistical model. During a pandemic any such domain would continue to be evaluated with its own domain-specific statistical model. During a pandemic, the operating characteristics of the domain-specific statistical model may be modified in the same way that the pandemic model is modified from the interpandemic model. For example, PISOP patients may be analyzed within a pandemic version of the domain specific statistical model utilizing a modified primary end-point, with application of informative priors derived from the interpandemic time period.

7.5.2. Pre-specification of trial parameter options

There are many clinical features of a respiratory pandemic that cannot be predicted in advance. For several parameters related to trial design and statistical analysis, this Appendix pre-specifies a range of options from which the actual modifications will be chosen at the commencement of a pandemic. The appendix provides guidance regarding the principles that would guide selection from within the available options and often provides the planned default option. The provision of flexibility regarding limited aspects of trial design provides the capacity to tailor aspects of the trial to the characteristics of the pandemic. For these decisions, the ITSC has decision-making responsibility, with advice from the PWG. These decisions would be regarded as operational and, unless otherwise specified (5.3.4), will be made prior to the conduct of the first adaptive analysis using the pandemic model and would be made only from within the range of options pre-specified in this Appendix. It is not intended that the selected parameters would be modified in any way during the pandemic unless advised to do so by the DSMB. The selected trial parameters would be placed in the public domain, on the study website, and provided as an update to participating sites and relevant ethical review bodies prior to the first adaptive analysis of the PISOP stratum. These parameters are set out in a document termed Operating Characteristics and this document applies to both REMAP-CAP core protocol documents as well as the REMAP-COVID Core Protocol, to the extent that is necessary. It is also acknowledged that specification in a new domain, may influence a pre-existing domain, such as specification of evaluation of an interaction between domains. In this situation, the DSA for the pre-existing domain will not necessarily be amended immediately with the most recently approved or amended DSA serving to specify the inter-relationship between the two domains.

7.5.3. Application of other strata specified in the Core Protocol in the pandemic model

The shock strata may be applied to the PISOP stratum. The default position is that the shock strata will not be applied to the PISOP stratum.

If the pandemic is caused by a novel strain of influenza the pre-existing influenza strata is not applied in the pandemic model. For PINSNP patients, the “influenza present” stratum would continue to apply and would be used to differentiate patients infected with a non-pandemic strain of influenza from patients in the “influenza not present” stratum. Membership of PISOP and influenza present stratum are mutually exclusive. It is anticipated that the influenza present stratum would apply only to patients with infection due to a proven non-pandemic strain of influenza at baseline. Patients in whom influenza was suspected, but the results of strain-specific diagnostic tests were not available at the time of assessment of eligibility, will be allocated to the PISOP stratum at sites where the stratum is active.

7.5.4. Strata within the PISOP stratum

A strata applied within the PISOP stratum is the confirmation status of pandemic infection, defined in two categories, present or absent, based on the results of microbiological tests for the pandemic organism. Any patient with clinically suspected pandemic infection who is not tested or the result is not yet known will be deemed positive.

The availability and interpretation of microbiological tests are likely to change during the pandemic and an operational document will be used to specify how different tests are interpreted. It is noted that pandemic infection confirmed status is defined by the final results of testing for the pandemic organism which may include analysis of samples collected after enrollment where it is reasonable to presume that the sample reflected pandemic infection status at time of enrollment.

The sensitivity of microbiological testing for the pandemic organism may not be known at the beginning or even during the pandemic¹⁷. It is anticipated that initial analysis of the pandemic model will occur without application of this pandemic confirmation status strata but this would be applied when there was sufficient confidence about the operating characteristics of diagnostic tests in patients who are critically ill. If the pandemic confirmation status is applied, the probabilities derived from patients who have confirmed pandemic infection will be used to determine the RAR proportions for patients receiving treatment assignments in the pandemic specific domains within the PISOP stratum. Borrowing is permitted between the pandemic infection confirmed stratum and the pandemic infection not present stratum, using the methods outlined in the Core Protocol (with $\gamma = 0.15$).

If eligibility criteria were modified to allow inclusion of a wider spectrum of illness severity, two or more states, related to severity of illness, may be applied within the PISOP stratum to distinguish current versus extended severity of illness.

7.5.5. States within the PISOP stratum

The Core Protocol defines ‘state’ as a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, defined by characteristics of a patient within the REMAP, that are capable of changing over time for a single patient at different time-points during the patient’s participation in the REMAP (i.e. they can be dynamic). During the pandemic, and only for patients in the PISOP stratum, two or more states may be defined, depending on illness severity. The default categorization of severity will be into two categories:

- Severe State, defined by receiving organ failure support in an ICU
- Moderate State, defined by
 - Not being admitted to an ICU, or
 - Admitted to an ICU but not receiving organ failure support

Organ failure supports that qualify a patient as severe are aligned to those that previously determined eligibility to the platform (i.e. the Severe State corresponds to the previous platform eligibility criteria). These criteria are:

- Provision of invasive mechanical ventilation
- Provision of non-invasive mechanical ventilation (including high flow nasal cannula with a flow rate of at least 30 litres per minutes and a fractional inspired oxygen concentration of 40% or higher)
- Receiving infusion of vasopressor or inotropes or both

Where states are defined, eligibility for domains or selected interventions within a domain, may be specified according to state. As such, a domain may be available in one or more states. Where a domain is available in two or more states, the interventions available in that domain in each state are permitted to vary. States can also be utilized within the statistical model to define the unit-of-analysis, with declaration of Platform Conclusions, independently in one or more states, with borrowing permitted between states.

A single patient can move between states, one or more times, during a period of time which the patient is potentially eligible within the REMAP. For the purposes of assessment of eligibility for one or more domains, state is ‘instantaneous’ as at the time of that assessment. A patient who has previously received non-invasive ventilation or an infusion of vasopressor or inotrope or both, but is not receiving either of those therapies at time of assessment is deemed to be in the Moderate State. A patient who has been in the Severe State, as a consequence of receiving invasive mechanical

ventilation in an ICU, cannot re-enter the Moderate State for the purposes of assessment of eligibility. A patient who receives an assignment in the REMAP while in the Severe State cannot receive any subsequent assignments in the Moderate State. Where trial related processes, such as reveal of assignment or obtaining consent, create a time gap between initial assessment of eligibility and awareness of the patient's assignment, the state in which the patient is analyzed is that which occurred at the time of assessment, not the time of reveal of the assignment.

A patient enrolled while in the Moderate State, if reassessed for eligibility for additional domains having progressed to the Severe State, may have new microbiological information that has accumulated during this interval of time. This could result in a patient with suspected pandemic infection having information that results in pandemic infection being excluded, at the time of reassessment. In this situation, the patient is analyzed in the pandemic model, as enrolled, in the Moderate State and is not eligible for enrollment in new domains in the Severe State (including domains evaluated in the interpandemic model). It is also noted that, for a patient who is enrolled in both states, that other time-varying baseline variables may have changed between each enrolment. For such patients, potentially time-varying baseline variables will be collected in reference to enrolment in the Moderate State and again in reference to enrolment in the Severe State.

7.5.6. Domains incorporated in the pandemic model and use of informative priors derived from the interpandemic model

The domains that will be included within the pandemic model will be determined at the onset of a pandemic by the ITSC with advice from the PWG. Where appropriate and prior to the first adaptive analysis that is undertaken after activation of the PATC, informative priors, derived from the interpandemic model (comprising patients enrolled in the REMAP prior to the pandemic), may be applied. If informative priors are applied, this is done by the Statistical Analysis Committee (SAC) who review the frequent adaptive analyses (and communicate these results to the DSMB on a regular basis). This will occur without knowledge of the values of the priors by the ITSC or any other investigator. The amount of influence that priors apply and how quickly priors are applied in combination with accruing new data will be specified by the ITSC. Coding that specifies the weighting of priors will be done by statisticians who are separate to the SAC and blind to results from adaptive analyses. With regard to selection of domains and the use of informative priors, the following principles will be applied.

7.5.6.1. *Non-influenza pandemic organism*

If the pandemic organism is not influenza, the following domains are intended to be included within the pandemic model:

- Corticosteroid Domain, without application of informative priors.
- Macrolide Duration Domain, without application of informative priors.
- New domains, as appropriate for the pandemic organism, without application of informative priors.

The Influenza Antiviral Domain (which includes only antiviral agents active against influenza) would not be applied in the pandemic model. It is noted that a patient at baseline could have suspected influenza and suspected pandemic infection which could lead to enrollment in the influenza domain (evaluated in the interpandemic model) and enrollment in other domains (evaluated in the pandemic model). It is not anticipated that the Antibiotic Domain is evaluated in the pandemic model, though this may be revised if the pandemic was caused by a bacterial pathogen. In this situation only those antibiotics that are known to be active against the pandemic organism would be available within the Antibiotic Domain for patients in the PISOP stratum.

7.5.6.2. Influenza pandemic

If the pandemic organism is influenza, the following domains are intended to be included within the pandemic model:

- Corticosteroid Domain, using informative priors derived from the influenza present stratum.
- Antiviral domain, using informative priors derived from the influenza positive stratum but with exclusion of any antiviral interventions that are clinically inappropriate because of the resistance profile of the pandemic strain of influenza. If there were no antiviral agents to which the pandemic strain of influenza was susceptible the Antiviral domain would not be applied in the PISOP stratum. During the pandemic if the pandemic strain of influenza acquired resistance to antiviral agents in the Antiviral Domain, these agents would be withdrawn from the domain at affected sites.
- Macrolide Duration Domain using informative priors derived from the unit-of-analysis of the Macrolide Duration Domain in the interpandemic model.
- New domains, as appropriate, without application of informative priors.

A number of other domains, related to organ failure support may be operative at the time of a pandemic. Domains such as oxygen saturation and hemodynamic targets would be expected to remain active during a pandemic. The default plan is that during a pandemic, patients in the PISOP and PINSNP strata will be eligible to receive an assignment in these domains and will be analyzed in the interpandemic model which will continue to be analyzed for statistical triggers and platform conclusions. Patients with pandemic infection will have their treatment assignments in such domains

weighted according to RAR as specified by the interpandemic model which will continue to be updated during a pandemic.

The ventilation domain, which utilizes a statistical model that applies only to that domain, is expected to continue during a pandemic. If appropriate, the pandemic strata may be applied to this domain. If so, the PISOP stratum would apply informative priors.

Any new domain that is initiated during a pandemic will be submitted for ethical review and require ethical approval prior to commencement.

7.5.7. Use of informative priors derived from information available from outside the REMAP

The default position is that informative priors derived from information that is external to the REMAP will not be utilized. However, if appropriate, based on high quality evidence, informative priors may be applied. The decision to apply informative priors lies with the ITSC and must involve consultation with relevant external stakeholders, the DSMB, and appropriate statistical advice regarding the potential implications for the use of informative priors.

7.6. Endpoints

7.6.1. Pandemic primary endpoint

Specified domains, for patients in the PISOP stratum, will be analyzed using a separate statistical model, for which the primary endpoint is called the “pandemic primary endpoint”. The default pandemic primary endpoint will be an ordinal scale that is a composite end-point that comprises mortality during the acute hospital admission and the number of whole and part study days for which the patient is alive and not requiring organ failure support while admitted to an ICU up until the end of study day 21. All patients who die before discharge from an acute hospital, irrespective of whether this occurs before or after D21, will be coded as –1 day. All patients who never receive organ failure support while admitted to an ICU will be coded as 22. Patients who die between D21 and discharge from an acute hospital will be updated at the time of the next adaptive analysis. All whole and part days after discharge from an acute hospital and before D21 will be counted as being not admitted to an ICU. Hospital readmission that included a new admission to ICU between first discharge from an acute hospital and D21 will not contribute to the primary end-point.

If appropriate, based on an understanding of clinical and biological factors, as well as operational factors, an alternative pandemic primary end-point may be specified at the time of activation of the PATC or at any time prior to the first interim analysis using the pandemic statistical model. Other

possible primary end-points include days alive and outside the ICU with alternative durations of follow up or the use of an alternative composite based on admission to ICU. The pandemic primary endpoint will be used for the adaptive analyses that inform the RAR and for Statistical Triggers.

If the primary end-point includes a time-based outcome measure, assignment to one or more domains will occur at different time-points if the patient receives assignments in one or more domains while in the Moderate State and one or more domains in the Severe State. The commencement of the period of observation commences at the time of assignment, which can lead to the same patient having different values for different domains, as determined by the state in which enrollment occurred. This can be accommodated because there are separate statistical models for each state. Where a patient is eligible for two or more domains in a state, assignment can only occur at a single time-point, i.e. it is not possible to have more than one time of assignment for different domains in the same state.

7.6.2. Secondary endpoints

All secondary endpoints that are specified in the Core Protocol and active DSAs will continue to be active. The primary end-point specified in the Core Protocol (all-cause mortality at day 90) is a secondary end-point in the PISOP stratum.

7.7. Principles of the statistical analysis

7.7.1. Adaptive analyses

Adaptive analyses may be conducted more frequently and with varying cadence during a pandemic. For analyses conducted in the pandemic model and the PISOP stratum of the ventilation model, data from all available patients will be utilized using, where appropriate, modelling to impute missing data. Adaptive analyses may be conducted at different frequency for the PISOP and PINSNP stratum.

7.7.2. Response adaptive randomization

For PISOP patients, RAR proportions for domains that are analyzed using the pandemic model will be derived from the pandemic model and the RAR proportions for domains that are analyzed using the interpandemic model will be derived from the interpandemic model. For PINSNP patients, the RAR proportions for all qualifying domains will be derived from the interpandemic model.

If feasible, the option of allowing sites to start with imbalanced RAR proportions may be utilized. During a pandemic, issues related to equipoise for sites to participate may be facilitated by allowing sites to select from a range of starting RAR proportions that are imbalanced. Being able to

implement this would be dependent on logistic feasibility as well as evaluation to exclude any adverse impact on inference.

Within the PISOP stratum, and only for domains with five or more interventions, the minimum RAR proportion may be decreased to less than 10% but will not be decreased to less than 5%.

7.7.3. Unit-of-analysis

7.7.3.1. *Application of additional strata*

Patients within the PISOP stratum may be further stratified dependent on whether pandemic infection is confirmed or not confirmed by microbiological testing. Additional strata may be applied and this can be specified in a DSA. Any or all of these strata can be utilized to determine eligibility for a domain or an intervention within a domain. These strata can also be used to define a unit-of-analysis in the pandemic statistical model.

7.7.3.2. *Application of state*

The state, at time of first enrollment, can also be used to determine eligibility or be used to define a unit-of-analysis or both. Where specified in the statistical model, the treatment effect of an intervention is allowed to vary between different states. A Bayesian Hierarchical Model (BHM) is used for all treatment-by-state interactions. In the BHM a hyperprior is used for the differing treatment effects across states. The standard deviation of the hyperprior, gamma, is a modelling starting estimate for the variation in the magnitude of the difference in treatment effects between states. By default, the starting estimate of the difference is zero. The gamma parameter influences the extent to which the treatment effect of interventions is permitted to vary between states. At the commencement of a model, the gamma parameter must be set, for each domain-state pair.

In this REMAP, only three options are permitted with respect to specifying the gamma parameter for each domain-state pair. Firstly, gamma may be set to zero. The effect of this is that treatment effect of an intervention is assumed proportional between specified states. The unit-of-analysis is not subdivided according to state. If gamma is set to zero for all states for a domain, the unit of analysis is all patients randomized in that domain. Secondly, and at the opposite extreme, gamma can be set to infinity. In this situation treatment effect is evaluated separately and independently in each state (with no borrowing between states). Thirdly, gamma may be set to a defined number between zero and infinity. This parameter value cannot be varied for different domain-state pairs, a global REMAP value has been selected. This specified value for gamma places a constraint on the variance of the difference in treatment effect in different states but permits the model to estimate treatment effect for patients enrolled in one state by borrowing from patients enrolled in one or more adjacent

states. Borrowing occurs to the extent that it is supported by the accumulated data, but the setting of gamma influences the amount of borrowing and how quickly borrowing is able to occur. The value of gamma that has been chosen has been determined by simulations to achieve a compromise between type I and type II error in baseline scenarios that assume either equivalence or superiority. Where a value for gamma is specified in the pandemic statistical model, in this REMAP the value of gamma will be 0.15.

A patient who is enrolled in a defined state, may have a clinical course that evolves with the patient entering a new state. Progression from one state, to another, may trigger eligibility for one or more domains. Where this occurs and the change in state defines a new unit-of-analysis, the RAR proportions may be different in each state. In this situation the RAR proportions that are relevant to that patient's state will be applied. In this regard, randomization to one or more domains in an initial state will occur, using RAR proportions that apply to that state with a separate subsequent randomization to one or more domains occurring if the patient enters a new state, with RAR proportions that apply to that state. When a new state commences there may be insufficient patients to determine valid RAR proportions for that domain in the new state. In this situation either RAR proportions are balanced or RAR proportions from an adjacent state are applied (unless otherwise specified in a DSA).

The RAR proportions that apply when state is used to define a unit-of-analysis are derived from all patients who receive an assignment in a domain in that state, irrespective of whether the patient was assigned an intervention in a different domain in a different state.

7.7.3.3. Analyses for combinations of therapies

Unless otherwise specified in a DSA, a Platform Conclusion can be reached for combinations of treatments that are being evaluated within the platform. This applies to interventions within a domain as well as interventions in different domains. As such, all of the following can be reported as Platform Conclusions: an interaction between interventions in different domains and that the treatment effect of more than one active intervention is different to a no treatment (standard of care) intervention. A domain that contains two or more treatments, each of which is assigned against a no treatment control in a factorial manner (i.e. the N x N table of yes / no for n treatments) will be analyzed as an N x N factorial. Structuring the analysis in this way allows the model to learn more quickly about the effectiveness of each treatment, recognizing common treatment exposure across intervention assignments.

7.7.4. Thresholds for statistical triggers

7.7.4.1. *Introduction*

The Core Protocol specifies thresholds for Statistical Triggers that apply to superiority, inferiority, and equivalence. For PISOP patients, different thresholds for Statistical Triggers may apply during a pandemic. The decision to modify a statistical threshold will be made by the ITSC prior to the first adaptive analysis of the pandemic model. Different thresholds may be applied to different domains. Thresholds can also be specified that are asymmetric for example less stringent for inferiority than superiority. Factors that the ITSC will take into account in considering whether to modify a threshold include whether the interventions being evaluated are comparative effectiveness options (i.e. interventions that are available as part of standard care and available outside the platform) or experimental interventions with uncertain safety and risk profile that may be available only within the platform.

All decisions regarding thresholds for Statistical Triggers will be communicated to participating sites and placed in the public domain on the study website. Once specified, thresholds cannot be modified unless recommended by the DSMB.

The default thresholds are outlined in the following sections.

7.7.4.2. *Intervention Superiority Statistical Trigger*

At any adaptive analysis, if a single intervention has at least a 0.99 posterior probability of being a member of the optimal regimen, for that unit-of-analysis, then that intervention will be deemed as being superior to all other interventions in that domain in that target population.

The declaration of a Platform Conclusion by the DSMB for superiority will result in application of 100% RAR (see section 7.6.4). Following implementation of 100% RAR, the posterior probability will continue to be updated and evaluated by the DSMB who are empowered to act if they have concerns regarding the validity of a Platform Conclusion.

7.7.4.3. *Intervention Efficacy Statistical Trigger*

For any domain that has (or had) a non-active control intervention, statistical triggers for efficacy of other interventions can be determined. At any adaptive analysis, if a single intervention has at least a 0.99 posterior probability of being superior to the inactive control intervention, for that unit-of-analysis, then that intervention will be deemed as being effective in that domain in that target population. At any adaptive analysis, if a single intervention has a greater than 90% probability of

being harmful, compared to an inactive control intervention, for that unit-of-analysis, then the intervention will be deemed as being harmful in that domain in that target population.

The declaration of a Platform Conclusion by the DSMB for efficacy may not result in any actions and may occur after the non-active intervention has been removed. This Platform Conclusion mathematically would occur simultaneously to Superiority in a 2-intervention domain. If a determination of efficacy for an intervention with a currently randomized non-active control then the non-active control should be dropped and the RAR set to 0. In contrast, declaration of a Platform Conclusion for harm will result in removal of that intervention from the platform for that unit-of-analysis, together with Public Disclosure.

7.7.4.4. Intervention Inferiority Statistical Trigger

At any adaptive analysis, if a single intervention has less than a 0.01 posterior probability of being a member of the optimal regimen, for a unit-of-analysis, then that intervention will be deemed as being inferior to other interventions in the domain for that target population. The 0.01 threshold is reduced as a function of how many units-of-analysis are available for the inferiority calculation (divided by the number of units minus 1). An asymmetrical inferiority statistical trigger may be set, particularly if an active intervention was being evaluated against an intervention that specifies no active treatment in that domain.

7.7.4.5. Equivalence and futility

The equivalence boundary (delta) for different endpoints selected for the PISOP stratum may be changed depending on the clinical impact of the delta for the chosen endpoint. The default delta for the Core Protocol will be used to select clinically similar effects on the chosen primary endpoint. If a mortality or 21-day ICU- or organ support-free day endpoint is selected the 20% proportional odds equivalency delta will be the default.

Alternatively, a DSA may specify a futility boundary (delta) with respect to the primary end-point. For the pandemic primary end-point, the default futility boundary for an intervention will be set as a posterior probability of less than 0.05 for at least a 20% odds-ratio improvement. This rule corresponds to the one-sided equivalency region.

7.7.4.6. Statistical thresholds for early phase interventions

During the pandemic there may be need to test multiple candidate interventions that are at an early phase of development, identifying those interventions that are most promising to be retained within the platform. Such interventions may be evaluated after a fixed recruitment against a 'stop-go'

criteria for retention, and expansion, within the platform. The default threshold for retention and expansion of an intervention will be a posterior probability of 0.5 or more that there is at least a 30% benefit in odds ratio.

7.7.5. Actions when a Statistical Trigger is achieved

The actions that occur when a statistical trigger is achieved are those which are specified in the Core Protocol. At the time of a Platform Conclusion that is relevant to public health or clinical management of patients with suspected or proven pandemic infection, the DSMB and ITSC are empowered to liaise directly with relevant public health authorities prior to public presentation or publication of results.

7.7.6. Pre-specified subgroup analyses after achievement of a platform conclusion

Pre-specified subgroup analyses that will be conducted after a Platform Conclusion are outlined in each DSA. If a DSA does not specify a sub-group analysis related to the pandemic strata such analysis is permitted if the PISOP stratum has been open.

7.7.7. Closure of the PISOP stratum and incorporation of data from pandemic statistical model into the interpandemic statistical model

The ITSC is permitted to close or suspend the PISOP stratum. At this time, evaluation of new patients within the pandemic model will cease. After the permanent closure of the PISOP stratum, the information related to domains that have been analyzed for PISOP patients within the pandemic model will be added to the interpandemic model retaining, if appropriate, a co-variate or stratum status, to reflect that the patient was enrolled in the PISOP stratum.

7.7.8. Domains with their own statistical model

It is intended that domains with their own statistical model (e.g. as anticipated for the ventilation domain) will continue to be analyzed using the separate statistical model. If the PISOP stratum was applied to such a domain it is intended that a pandemic version of the separate model would be commenced and enroll only patients in the PISOP stratum. This model would utilize the pandemic primary end-point and would use informative priors derived from the preceding model. An operational decision may be made to apply an end-point that is different to the pandemic primary end-point in a domain with its own model.

8. GOVERNANCE, ETHICAL, AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN A PANDEMIC

8.1. Decision to activate pandemic stratum

The decision to open the pandemic stratum lies with the ITSC. In deciding to activate the pandemic stratum the ITSC should take into account, but is not dependent on, declaration of a pandemic by the WHO and decisions about pandemic activation by regional pandemic preparedness consortia.

The decision to open will be communicated to RCCs and participating sites as an operational document. Each RCC will maintain a log of the dates for which sites were activated for the PISOP stratum.

8.2. Safety Monitoring and Reporting

During the interpandemic period, the platform evaluates solely or predominantly interventions that are in widespread clinical use for severe CAP and for which the safety profile of the intervention is well described. During a pandemic, the platform may evaluate therapeutic agents that have been repurposed or are an Investigational Medical Product. Such therapeutic agents may not have an established safety profile or an established safety profile when used in critically ill patients. Where an intervention is not regarded as having an established safety profile, this will be specified in the DSA. For this type of interventions more specific or more detailed SAE reporting will be required that is specified in the Core Protocol, as follows.

This may include Adverse Events of Special Interest (AESI). SAEs that might be attributable to specific interventions are included as secondary endpoints in each DSA but are recorded only for participants who are enrolled in that domain. If more detailed SAE or AE/AESI reporting is required for an intervention, then this additional safety reporting requirement will be specified in the relevant DSA and recorded only for participants who are enrolled in that domain. The following arrangements apply to such

When submitting the SAE form the local site PI should determine if the SAE is attributable to one or more study interventions in this trial. The local PI will assess if it is possible, probable, or certain that there is a direct link between a trial intervention and the SAE (a Serious Adverse Drug Reaction, SADR).

The regional / country project manager should review the SAE form for completeness and query any missing data with the site. Preliminary SAE report forms should be submitted as soon as the site becomes aware. It is recognised that follow-up information may be available later.

The regional lead investigator, or medically qualified designee, should review the SAE to assess expectedness and causality. The regional lead investigator or delegate cannot downgrade the site's assessment of expectedness and causality. The following requirements are specified:

- The regional Sponsor should be made aware of the SAE within 24 hours of the SAE being reported.
- All SAEs must be followed-up until resolution, or end of trial if this is sooner.
- SAEs will be reported to the relevant ethics committee and competent authority according to local regulations and requirements.

All SAEs, pooled from all regions, will be reported to the DSMB at intervals agreed by the REMAP-CAP investigators and the DSMB. This may vary depending on the specific intervention being evaluated. The DSMB may request additional specialist review of safety data for certain interventions.

If drugs have been supplied by a pharmaceutical company, then reporting of safety data to the company may be required. The details of this reporting will be included in individual Safety Data Exchange Agreements (SDEA).

On an annual basis a Developmental Safety Update Report (DSUR) will be produced including all SAE data from all regions in REMAP-CAP and will be submitted to the relevant competent authorities as required. This may be shared with pharmaceutical companies as part of the SDEA.

If an SAE is determined to be unexpected (not previously described in the Summary of Product Characteristics / Investigator Brochure / Protocol) and related to the study medication then it is considered a SUSAR. In these cases, the following steps should also be undertaken, in addition the performing the steps described above for handling SAEs:

- The relevant competent authorities and ethics committees should be notified of the SUSAR by the Sponsor or designee in each region.
- A SUSAR that results in death or is life-threatening, should be reported to the aforementioned bodies within 7 days of the Sponsor (or designee) becoming aware of the

event. Further relevant information should be sought and a follow-up report completed as soon as possible and submitted within 8 additional days.

A SUSAR which does not result in death or is not life-threatening should be reported within 15 days of the Sponsor (or designee) becoming aware of the event or in accordance with the local regulatory requirements. Further relevant information should be given as soon as possible. The regional / country project managers should notify all investigators at all sites that a SUSAR has occurred. The REMAP-CAP DSMB should be notified that a SUSAR has occurred.

It may be necessary to take appropriate urgent safety measures in order to protect research participants against any immediate hazard to their health or safety, without prior authorisation from a regulatory body. If this occurs the regulatory bodies should be notified as soon as possible and in any event within three days, in the form of a substantial amendment, that such measures have been taken and the reasons why.

SAEs reported will be coded using the currently available version of the Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities (MedDRA). Coding will be to lowest level terms. The preferred term, and the primary system organ class will be listed. Summaries of all SAEs by treatment group will include:

- The number and percentage of patients with at least 1 SAE by system organ class and preferred term
- The number of SAEs by relationship to treatment (related, not related), presented by system organ class and preferred term

8.3. Data collection and management

A pandemic is likely to result in a substantial increase in clinical workload for sites participating in REMAP-CAP. This is acknowledged by the REMAP-CAP management, as is the primacy of patient care. The importance of contemporaneous data collection, particularly with respect to variables that are needed for adaptive analyses will be emphasized to sites. RCCs will seek to support sites as much as possible, including with requests to healthcare systems, public health authorities, and funding agencies to provide resources that allow sites to maintain data collection that is timely and complete.

8.4. Role of the DSMB

In a pandemic the role of the DSMB is modified, taking into account the public health importance of clinical evidence during a pandemic. In meeting the requirements of their Charter during a pandemic

the DSMB should consider issues of public health in addition to the well-being of participants and the scientific integrity of the platform. The in-principle views of the DSMB may be obtained by the ITSC with regard to the setting of modified thresholds for statistical triggers.

While the PISOP stratum is open the DSMB is also permitted to liaise with public health authorities, regulatory authorities, or the DSMBs of trials evaluating the same or similar interventions regarding the results and appropriate interpretation of adaptive analyses in keeping with prevailing international standards. If the DSMB communicates with external groups the ITSC may be informed that such communication has occurred but the content of that communication may remain confidential between the DSMB and the relevant group. The DSMB may recommend to the ITSC that public reporting of posterior probabilities that have not attained a threshold for a Statistical Trigger should occur.

The workload of the DSMB may be substantial during a pandemic and, if requested by the DSMB, the ITSC will appoint additional members.

8.5. *Communication of trial results*

Any Platform Conclusion that is relevant to public health that occurs during a pandemic will be presented or published as soon as possible, noting that additional work to report baseline status and secondary end-points will need to occur prior to presentation and publication of results.

8.6. *Funding of the trial*

The trial is currently funded as described in the Core Protocol.

During the interpandemic period and during a pandemic, additional funding will be sought to provide resources for activities that exceed those that will be occurring during the interpandemic period. Possible sources of additional resources include, but are not limited to, healthcare systems, pharmaceutical companies, public health authorities, and local and international research funding bodies.

A section of the Core Protocol indicates that “the trial will not enter into a contract with a commercial organization unless the contract specifies that, among other clauses, “that all data are owned by the trial and the commercial organization has no authority to access data”. This clause should not be interpreted as indicating that access to data by a commercial organization is not permitted. Such as access can be agreed, for example, by licensing access to data, if agreed by both a commercial partner and trial sponsors.

8.7. Monitoring

It is acknowledged that during a pandemic site monitoring may be delayed for logistical reasons. The operational monitoring plan may be updated to reflect issues that are specific to a pandemic. As outlined in Core Protocol, the DSMB will take into account intensity of monitoring and time of consideration of a Platform Conclusion. If appropriate, the contribution of data that has not been monitored as per the non-pandemic monitoring plan will be acknowledged in the public reporting of Platform Conclusions.

9. REFERENCES

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